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In Wino Mortuus'
I. INTRODUCTION
Drinking and academia have long been viewed as complementary bedfellows.
In Plato's Symposium, for example, a group of friends decided to exchange
speeches exploring the virtues of Love after feasting together.2 Following the meal,
the party-goers "were about to commence drinking" when they encountered a
problem-they were all terribly hungover from the previous night's festivities:
Pausanias said, And now, my friends, how can we drink with least injury
to ourselves? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of yesterday's
potations, and must have time to recover; and I suspect that most of you are
in the same predicament, for you were of the party yesterday. Consider
then: How can the drinking be made the easiest?
1. The phrase "In vino veritas," literally translated as "In wine, truth," was used by Soren Kierkegaard
in his 1845 work, Stages on Life's Way, to express the complementary nature of alcohol and discourse. Scholars
view his Stages banquet scene as a modem counterpart to the banquet setting described in Plato's Symposium. See
Part I (examining the Symposium banquet). Kierkegaard wrote:
As the password for the occasion[, the host of the banquet] fixed upon In vino veritas, because, though
speeches were to be allowed as well as conversation, no speeches might be made except in vino, and
no truths were to be heard except such as are in vino, when wine vindicates the truth and the truth
vindicates the wine.
INViNoVERrrAs:AREcoLcrON,AKmuKoAA ANTHOLooY 179(RobcrtBretalled., Princeton Univ. Press
1946) (1845). Thus, the term "In vino mortuus," or "In wine, death," is an apropos label for the modem
phenomenon of alcohol related hazing deaths.
2. Symposium, THE WORKS OF PLATo 333 (Irwin Edman ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., The Modem
Library 1956) (1928).
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I entirely agree, said Aristophanes, that we should, by all means, avoid hard
drinking, for I was myself one of those who were yesterday drowned in
drink.
3
Following a brief discussion, the friends "all agreed that drinking [was] to be
voluntary, and that there [was] to be no compulsion."4 After a few brief speeches
exploring the virtues of Love, a highly intoxicated visitor named Alcibiades arrived
unexpectedly and sought to join in the celebration.5 After he noticed that the group
was but casually drinking, Alcibiades said:
You seem, my friends, to be sober, which is a thing not to be endured; you
must drink-for that was the agreement under which I was admitted-and
I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk.6
By the end of the story, all of the participants were well inebriated! Those who
had not succumbed to the intoxicating effects of the wine stayed up for the
remainder of the night, listening to further discourses by Socrates By the early
morning, Socrates was the only one who remained awake.9
Under modem hazing statutes, Alcibiades' actions might be construed as
hazing. 10 In Idaho, for example, the definition of "haze" includes "to require [or]
encourage... that [a] person be subjected to... [c]ompelled ingestion of any
substance.""
3. Id. at 338.
4. Id. at 339.
5. Id. at 380.
6. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 392.
8. Id. at 392-93.
9. Id. at 393. In fact, Socrates was infamous for his ability to consume large amounts of wine and was the
lone survivor of that evening's festivities. Said Alcibiades during the night: "Mhis ingenious trick of mine [filling
a vessel with two quarts of wine for Socrates' consumption] will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any
quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk." Id. at 382.
10. See infra Part III.B (discussing state hazing statutes).
11. See IDAHO CODE § 18-917 (1997) (setting forth the definition for "hazing"). Section 18-917 reads, in
relevant part:
(1) No member of a fraternity, sorority or other living or social student organization... shall
intentionally haze or conspire to haze any member, potential member or person pledged to be a
member of the organization, as a condition or precondition of attaining membership in the
organization or of attaining any office or status therein.
(2) As used in this section, "haze" means to subject a person to bodily danger or physical harm or
a likelihood of bodily danger or physical harm, or to require, encourage, authorize or permit that
the person be subjected to any of the following:
(a) Total or substantial nudity on the part of the person;
(b) Compelled ingestion of any substance by the person;
(c) Wearing or carrying of any obscene or physically burdensome article by the person;
(d) Physical assaults upon or offensive physical contact with the person;
(e) Participation by the person in boxing matches, excessive number of calisthenics, or
other physical contests;
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Unfortunately, however, modem examples of hazing are not nearly as mild as
merely encouraging another to become intoxicated. At Louisiana State University,
for example, a pledge of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity was pressured to
continue drinking obscene amounts of liquor-including pitchers of beer, seven or
eight Jell-O shots,' 2 and fifteen or sixteen other types of shots--even after vomiting
blood.'3 In 1993, a former University of Maryland student was beaten with a
hammer, a horsehair whip, and a broken chair leg.'4 One 1997 pledge to the Delta
Sigma Phi chapter at Western Carolina University woke up in a general store
parking lot, covered in blood, and missing his shoes and shirt, after that fraternity's
"midnight party."'
5
While the above examples are undeniably tragic, recent cases of fraternal
hazing have assumed a more frightening face as some pledges have been forced to
drink themselves to death. These deaths have posed new legal questions for courts
deciding lawsuits brought by aggrieved family members.' 6 Most of the fifty states
have enacted hazing statutes in an attempt to punish this type of reckless behavior, 7
but their efficacy in preventing further such incidents has yet to be realized.
This Comment will begin with an overview of recent studies involving college
students and alcohol consumption.' s Next, the Comment will evaluate the
phenomenon of hazing, noting the similarities and differences among various state
hazing statutes.19 The constitutionality of the these hazing statutes will likewise be
(f) Transportation and abandonment of the person;
(g) Confinement of the person to unreasonably small, unventilated, unsanitary or
unlighted areas;
(h) Sleep deprivation; or
(i) Assignment of pranks to be performed by the person.
(4) A member of a fraternity, sorority or other student organization, who personally violates any
provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
12. "Jell-O shots" are pieces of flavored gelatin prepared with alcohol-usually vodka--that party-goers
eat to become intoxicated.
13. See A 20/20 Investigation Into Frat House Drinking: A Sea ofAlcohol, at 6 (ABC television broadcast
transcript, Sept. 4, 1998) [hereinafter Sea of Alcohol] (detailing the experiences of a pledge who attended the
Sigma Alpha Epsilon "bid-night" party held at an off-campus bar). The pledge reported that five plastic trash cans
had been placed in the middle of the bar to serve as receptacles for sick pledges. Id. at 5-6. After telling a member
of the fraternity that he had vomited blood, the pledge was told "(w]ho cares. You keep drinking now." Id. at 6.
14. See David S. Doty, No More Hazing: Eradication Through Law and Education, 10 Nov. UTAH B. J.
18, 18 (1997) (describing the beating endured by one pledge who was later awarded $375,000 after suing the
fraternity).
15. Sea ofAlcohol, supra note 13, at 3-5. This portion of the broadcast recounts the experience of another
pledge who was forced to drink large quantities of beer and liquor as part of an initiation party. The pledge, who
claimed that he "blacked out" after drinking and becoming sick, was later told that he was "jumped" by 10 or 15
people. Id.
16. See infra Part IV (discussing pledge deaths resulting in wrongful death actions).
17. See infra Part IHL.B (examining state hazing statutes).
18. See infra Part H (detailing college drinking trends and alcohol consumption among members of Greek
organizations).
19. See infra Part lIM.B (examining state hazing statutes).
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evaluated,20 before the question of civil liability and its relationship to hazing
statutes is examined, via various cases regarding fraternal hazing and alcohol-
related deaths.2'
II. BINGE DRINKING-GENERAL STATISTICS
At least one article reporting on collegiate drinking trends of the 1990s has
suggested that the once infamous term "Party hearty" ought to be replaced by the
more lamenting "Party hardly."' Others, however, have referred to the drinking
habits of college students as "a self-fulfilling prophecy," because college students
erroneously believe that drinking is more prevalent than it is and incorrectly try to
"catch up."23 In 1993, for example, University of Michigan students participating
in a national study said "they believed [that] ninety-five percent of students drink
at least once a week[; i]n reality, [however,] only sixty-four percent of males and
58 percent of females drank that often." 24 Regardless of the label chosen to
characterize collegiate drinking habits, recent studies and statistics' clearly show
that college students-especially members of Greek organizations-are consuming
alcohol at alarming rates, often leading to injury26 and even death. 7
A. Binge Drinking and the Harvard School of Public Health Study
One of the biggest concerns surrounding collegiate alcohol consumption centers
around the phenomenon of "binge drinking.' ' 8 A 1995 Harvard School of Public
Health study defined "binge drinking" for men "as havingfive or more drinks in a
20. See infra Part lII.C (exploring the constitutionality of two state hazing statutes).
21. See infra Part IV (discussing the question of civil liability in the context of fraternal hazing).
22. Lewis Lord, From Party Hearty to Party Hardly? The Greek System. Mired in a Rush Recession, Gives
Grades and Good Deeds the College Try, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 1, 1997, at 96-97. Lord's article
suggests that the recent drop in the number of students who pledge andjoin fraternities and sororities marks a new
era in collegiate drinking habits. Id. One reason for this purported slump "is that the wild drinking culture glorified
in the movie National Lampoon's Animal House has fallen out of favor with career-minded students bent on
making good grades and administrators determined to restore order." Id.
23. Ron French et al., Colleges Gain in War on Drinking: Some Say Problem on State Campuses Not as
Bad as Thought, THE DETRorrNEws, Oct. 26,1998.
24. Id.
25. SeegenerallyHENRYwEmCsER, ETAL HarvardSchool ofPublicHealth, Binge Drinking on Campus:
Results of a National Study (visited Nov. 24,1998) <http'//www.edc.org/heclpubs/bihnge.htm> (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (summarizing the findings of samples taken from 17,600 students enrolled in four-
year colleges).
26. See id. at 5 (reporting that of all the respondents from the Harvard study who qualified as binge
drinkers, 14% of women and 17% of men admitted to having sustained personal injuries one or more times as a
result of drinking).
27. See infra Part IV.B (examining cases involving alcohol-related deaths).
28. See supra Part II (defining and discussing binge drinking)..
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row, and for women as having four or more drinks in a row."'29 The study, which
evaluated more than 17,000 student responses from four-year institutions, found
that forty-four percent of all U.S. college students engaged in binge drinking during
the two weeks prior to the study.30 Half of those binge drinkers further qualified as
"frequent" binge drinkers, or students who engaged in binge drinking three or more
times in a two-week period.3' Thus, one in every five students surveyed qualified
as a frequent binge drinker. One student surveyed claimed: "I drank at least fifteen
beers [in one night], and then I completely blacked out. This is not uncommon for
me."
32
The survey included a comprehensive profile of binge drinkers.33 White college
students were twice as likely to be binge drinkers than were students from other
racial and ethnic groups.34 Students who claimed that athletic participation was
important to them were almost one-and-one-half times as likely to be binge
drinkers, while residents of fraternities and sororities were four times as likely (the
largest discrepancy in the study) to be binge drinkers compared to other students. 35
B. Binge Drinking and Fraternities
"We bond. We are brothers. We drink.,3
6
During the 1996-97 school year, six percent of the 12.5 million undergraduates
at four-year schools were part of the Greek system--nearly four hundred-thousand
men and just over three hundred-thousand women.37 Although it is hard to
determine exactly why drinking is commonly viewed as a condition precedent to
fraternity membership, mottos, like the one set forth above, and fraternity songs,
29. WECSH.ER, supra note 25, at 2. For the purposes of the study, a "drink" was defined "as a 12-ounce
can or bottle of beer, a 12-ounce can or bottle of wine cooler, a four-ounce glass of wine, or a shot of liquor, either
straight or in a mixed drink." Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 2. The study showed that 50% of males and 39% of females qualified as binge drinkers. Id. at
3.
31. Id.at3.
32. Id. at 4; see also Sea ofAlcohol, supra note 13, at 3-4 (reporting the story of one fraternity pledge who
claimed to drink five out of seven nights, sometimes consuming up to one case, or twenty-four cans, of beer).
33. WECsHLER, supra note 25, at 4.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id.; see also French et aL., supra note 23 (quoting one study which found that 10% of students drink
nearly 75% of all the alcohol consumed). These numbers suggest that the members of Greek organizations
consume a disproportionately high percentage of all liquor consumed by college students.
36. See Sea of Alcohol, supra note 13, at 7 (quoting an anonymous fraternity motto that illustrates the
nexus between the tradition of alcohol and fraternities).
37. Lord, supra note 22, at 9697; see also Susan Tifft, Waging War on the Greek: Fraternities and
SorritiesAre Being Forced to Clean Up Their Acts, TIME, Apr. 16, 1990, at 64, 64 (suggesting that in 1990
fraternity membership was experiencing "a nationwide renaissance"). In the 1970s, for example, fraternity
membership reached a low point, with only 179,000 members nationwide; by 1990, that number had mushroomed
to nearly 400,000 members. Id.
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which emphasize pride vis-a-vis drinking,38 illustrate the integral part that drinking
plays within the Greek culture. One male college student commented: "[y]ou have
to... drink as much as you can, especially around the time when you're trying to
get into a fraternity."' Another said: "[w]ith eighty people standing around
watching you, it's kind of hard just to say 'I can't drink anymore. ' ' '4°
Dr. Henry Wecshler, the principal investigator in the Harvard study, found that
more than eighty percent of fraternity members qualified as binge drinkers. Stories
that detail fraternity traditions clearly seem to corroborate this finding: pledges of
the Delta Sigma Phi fraternity at Western Carolina University, for example, claimed
to drink an average of five nights a week after joining the fraternity.42 Having
established this nexus between the Greek life and binge drinking, certain fraternal
initiation traditions which utilize alcohol--commonly referred to as
"hazing"--have posed new legal questions involving civil liability.
Il. HAZING
A. The History of Hazing
Hazing has existed in some form probably in every school since
time immemorial. No code of laws or regulations... has ever
eliminated it from the category of boyish pranks, and in the nature
of things never will.43
One theory defines the common thread behind all forms of hazing as a "formal
introduction into some position or club.., which [signifies] that the beginner has
been given some new knowledge.'" Although there is no universally accepted
definition of "hazing," Illinois law in 1901 defined the practice as "any pastime or
amusement, engaged in by students or other people in schools, academies, colleges,
universities, or other educational institutions . . . whereby such pastime or
38. See Ballou v. Sigma Nu Gen. Fraternity, 352 S.E.2d 488,491 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that
participants in a 1979 Sigma Nu pledge night party at the University of South Carolina had to drink from the "cup
of truth" while singing a song entitled, "I drink to Sigma Nu" containing the refrain "Drink! Drink! Drink! Men
brave and true! Drink! Drink! Drink! To our Sigma Nu").
39. See CNN Newsroom Worldview at 5 (CNN television broadcast transcript, Oct. 1, 1997) (explaining
why some students feel compelled to drink when pledging fraternities).
40. Sea ofAlcohol. supra note 13, at 4.
41. Id. at 3.
42. See id. (interviewing pledges who said they drank an average of six beers five out of seven nights a
week after joining their fraternity).
43. Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Criminalization of Fraternity, Non-Fraternity and Non-Collegiate
Hazing, 61 Miss. LJ. 111, 112 n.7 (1991) (quoting Benjamin, Concerning "Hazing" at the United States Naval
Academy, 52 THE INDEP. 3099,3100 (1900) (emphasis added)).
44. Id. at 113 (quoting Olmert, Points of Origin, SMITHSONIAN, Sept. 1983, at 150, 151.)
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amusement is had for the purpose of holding up any student, scholar or individual
to ridicule for the pastime of others.
45
Hazing, however, is not unique to American culture. In the Middle Ages, for
example, new students at European universities were required to work as servants
for upperclassmen.' Throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been
associated with organizations ranging from military groups to American Indian
tribes.47 The United States Congress passed the first hazing statute in 1874 to
address hazing within the United States Naval Academy.
48
Today, hazing practices have been observed in a wide variety of groups within
American society-including oil rig workers,49 school marching bands,50 high
school football teams, 5 the military,5 2 and professional sports teams. 53 Despite its
widespread appeal to various groups and organizations within American culture,
hazing has become most closely associated with college fraternities. In the 1964
case of New York v. Lenti (Lenti ),5 County Judge Albert A. Oppido commented
that "[fjraternal organizations and associations have never suffered for ideas in
45. 1901 Ill. Laws p. 145, §2.
46. Lewis, supra note 43, at 112 n.4.
47. Id. at 112 n.5 (citing Olmert, Points ofOrigin, SMiTHSONIAN, Sept. 1983, at 150-51). In one California
Indian tribe, for example, a puberty initiation rite included stinging young boys with nettles and ants before
requiring them to fast. Id.
48. See Lewis, supra note 43, at 117 (explaining an 1874 Congressional statute which forbade "plebe
bedevilment" within the Naval Academy).
49. See Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922,923-24 (5th Cir. 1982) (detailing the experiences of
one new employee who was greased with oil, showered with ammonia and thrown into a cold shower as part of
a ritual for oil rig workers).
50. See University Checks Reports of Hazing, SUN-SENTiNEL, Nov. 6, 1998, at 6B (reporting on a Florida
A&M University investigation into hazing practices in the "Marching 100," one of the nation's best known college
marching bands). Eight new members of the band complained of hazing practices that included punching and
paddling. Id.
51. See Anthony Thornton, McAlester Parents Indignant at School's Lax Hazing Stance[;] 'Idiotic
Statements' May Prompt Suit, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 19, 1999, at 19 (detailing the story of one high
school freshman who claimed that he was knocked to the ground and beaten by ten members of the football team
as part of initiation onto the team).
52. See Tom Beyerlein, Three Marines Held in Hazing, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Jan. 29, 1999, at lB
(describing how three Marines based in Okinawa subjected Private Aaron Lemon to an initiation right called the
"Red Patch"). The rite involved binding the initiate's wrists and ankles with duct tape before ripping it loose; the
resulting red marks were supposed to symbolize the red patches worn on the Marines uniforms. Id.; see also Eric
L. Wee, Judge Orders Community Service for Two Charged in VMI Hazing, THE WAsH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1999, at
B4 (noting that two former cadets at the Virginia Military Institute were ordered to serve 56 hours apiece of
community service after being charged with beating VMI freshmen with a belt and coat hanger).
53. See Mary Foster, Danish Sues Saints, Players Over Hazing Injury, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct.
22, 1998, at 2C (explaining how free-agent rookie Jeff Danish initiated a civil action against the New Orleans
Saints after sustaining injuries in a training camp hazing incident). Danish broke a dormitory window when he
crashed into it after running the "gauntlet," which consisted of veteran players lining the halls and hitting rookie
players as they ran through. Id. Danish, who is suing the Saints for more than $650,000, required fourteen stitches
in his left arm and sustained facial bruises. Id.
54. 253 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Nassau County Ct. 1964) [hereinafter Lenti].
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contriving new forms of hazing."5 5 To combat the dynamic nature of hazing, state
hazing statutes have taken on as many forms as the hazing practices themselves.
B. Hazing Statutes
At least forty states have enacted some form of statute addressing the problem
of hazing 6 The most common type of statute broadly defines the term "hazing."
The Delaware Code, for example, defines "hazing" as:
[A]ny action or situation which recklessly or intentionally endangers the
mental or physical health or safety of a student or which wilfully destroys
or removes public or private property for the purpose of initiation or
admission into or affiliation with, or as a condition for continued
membership in, any organization operating under the sanction of or
recognized as an organization by an institution of higher learning. The term
shall include, but not be limited to, any brutality of a physical nature, such
as whipping, beating, branding, forced calisthenics, exposure to the
elements, forced consumption of any food, liquor, drug or other substance,
or any other forced physical activity which could adversely affect the
physical health and safety of the individual, and shall include any activity
which would subject the individual to extreme mental stress, such as sleep
deprivation, forced exclusion from social contact, forced conduct which
could result in embarrassment, or any other forced activity which could
adversely affect the mental health or dignity of the individual, or any wilful
destruction or removal of public or private property. For purposes of this
definition, any activity as described in this definition upon which the
55. Id. at 13.
56. ALA. CODE § 16-1-23 (1995); ARK. CODEANN. § 6-5-201 (Michie 1993); CAL.EDUc. CODE §§ 32050
&32051 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-124 (West Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-23a
(West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 9301-04 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.262 (West 1998); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-61 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 18-917 (1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/0.01, 120/5 & 120/10
(West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-42-2-2 (West 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.10 (West 1993); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3434 (1995); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.375 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1801
(West 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 10004 (West 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 268H (1996);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 269, §§ 17-19 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §127.465 (West 1999); MISS. CODE
ANN. §97-3-105 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.360,578.363 & 578.365 (West 1995); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-
311.06 & 28-311.07 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.605 (Michie Supp. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 631:7 (1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:40-3 & 2C:40-4 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.16 & 120.17
(McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-35, 14-36 & 14-38 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-10 (1997);
OHIOREV. CODEANN. §§ 2307.44 & 2903.31 (West 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1190 (West Supp. 1999);
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.197 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5351-5354 (West 1992); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-21-1,
11-21-2 & 11-21-3 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-510,16-3-520,16-3-530, 16-3-540 & 59-101-200 (Law. Co-
op Supp. 1998); TEx. EDUC. CODEANN. §§ 37.151-157 (West 1996); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-5-107.5 (1999); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-56 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28B.10.900-902 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE
§§ 18-16-2, 18-16-3 & 18-16-4 (Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.51 (West 1996).
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admission or initiation into or affiliation with or continued membership in
an organization is directly or indirectly conditioned shall be presumed to
be "forced" activity, the willingness of an individual to participate in such
activity notwithstanding.57
As indicated by the Delaware statute, state legislatures have gone to great lengths
to ensure that statutes prohibiting hazing cover every possible activity which might
jeopardize the mental and physical health or safety of affected individuals. 58 Instead
of providing a laundry list of activities that constitute hazing, some statutes paint
with broader strokes and define "hazing" by focusing on the effects of prohibited
acts rather than on the acts themselves, or on a combination thereof. Arkansas, for
example, defines "hazing" as:
(1) Any willful act on or off the property of any school, college, university, or
other educational institution.., by one (1) student alone or acting with
others which is directed against any other student and done for the purpose
of intimidating the student attacked by threatening him with social or other
ostracism or of submitting such student to ignominy, shame, or disgrace
among his fellow students, and acts calculated to produce such results; or
(2) The playing of abusive or truculent tricks on or off the property of any
school, college, university, or other educational institution.., by one (1)
student alone or acting with others, upon another student to frighten or
scare him; or
(3) Any willful act on or off the property of any school, college, university, or
other educational institution.., by one (1) student alone or acting with
others which is directed against any other student and done for the purpose
of humbling the pride, stifling the ambition, or impairing the courage of the
student attacked or to discourage him from remaining in that school.., or
reasonably to cause him to leave the institution rather than submit to such
acts; or
(4) Any willful act on or off the property of any school, college, university or
other educational institution.., by one (1) student alone or acting with
others in striking, beating, bruising, or maiming; or seriously offering,
threatening, or attempting to strike, beat, bruise, or maim; or to do or
seriously offer, threaten, or attempt to do physical violence to any student
of any such educational institution; or any assault upon any such student
made for the purpose of committing any of the acts, or producing any of the
results, to such student as defined in this section.5
57. DEL. CODE ANN. 6. 14, § 9302 (1993).
58. Id.
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-5-201 (Lexis 1999).
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Some statutes provide a much shorter definition of "hazing." Kansas, for
example, defines "hazing" as
[I]ntentionally, coercing, demanding or encouraging another person to
perform as a condition of membership in a social or fraternal organization,
any act which could reasonably be expected to result in great bodily harm,
disfigurement or death or which is done in a manner whereby great bodily
harm, disfigurement or death could be inflicted. 6°
Regardless of the exact language employed, statutes enacted to combat hazing
generally prohibit any activity intended to cause-or which foreseeably may
cause-physical harm, disfigurement or death.6'
Most hazing violations are treated as misdemeanors and offenders are punished
with monetary penalties62 or a combination of jail time and monetary penalties.'
Florida law requires each educational institution to adopt and enforce penalties for
violations of hazing policies, and suggests that "[s]uch penalties may include the
imposition of fines[,] the withholding of diplomas or transcripts pending
compliance with the rules or pending payment of fines[,] and the imposition of
probation, suspension, or dismissal."64 Some statutes also include a type of
provision stating that punishment under a hazing statute does not preclude or limit
prosecution for another crime or pursuit of civil remedies.6
60. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3434(b) (1995); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32050 (West 1994) (prohibiting
"any pastime or amusement engaged in... which causes, or is likely to cause, bodily danger, physical harm, or
personal degradation or disgrace resulting in physical or mental harm, to any student"); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-42-
2-2(a)(1), (2) (West 1998) (stating, in part, that "'hazing' means forcing or requiring another person[,] with or
without the consent of the other person[,] and as a condition of association with a group or organization[,] to
perform an act that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury").
61. See, e.g., KAN. STAr. ANN. § 21-3434(b) (1995) supra note 60 and accompanying text; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.197 (1990) ("'[H]aze' means to subject a person to bodily danger or physical harm or a likelihood of bodily
danger or physical harm. . ').
62. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-23a(c), (d) (West 1994) (punishing organizations found guilty
of hazing with a fine of up to $1,500 and punishing individuals found guilty of the same with a fine of up to
$1,000); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.197(4), (5) (1990) (imposing a penalty for organizations not to exceed $1,000; for
individuals, $250); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.153(b)(1) (West 1996) (punishing organizations with "a fine of
not less than $5,000 nor more than $10,000").
63. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32051 (West 1994) (providing that violations of California hazing law
are misdemeanors, "punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100), nor more than five thousand
dollars ($5,000), or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or both"); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
5-61, 17-10-4 (1999) (labeling a violation of the hazing statute "a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature"
and punishing the offender with a fine of up to $5,000, up to twelve months in prison, or both).
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.262(2)(a)1 (West 1998).
65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-1-23(f) (1995) ("Nothing in this [hazing law] shall be construed as in any
manner affecting or repealing any law... respecting homicide, or murder, manslaughter, assault with intent to
murder, or aggravated assault."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-23a(e) (West 1994) ("This [hazing] section shall
not in any manner limit or exclude prosecution or punishment for any crime or any civil remedy.').
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C. The Constitutionality of Hazing Statutes
Given the broad prohibitions and sometimes subjective standards6 employed
in many of the states' hazing statutes, many statutes seem ripe for constitutional
challenge. Some defendants charged with violating these statutes have challenged
a statute's constitutionality by alleging that the statute is overbroad, 67 vague,68 and
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.69
An overbroad statute has been defined as "a statute that is written too broadly,
or more broadly than necessary-[i.e.] one that is designed to burden or punish
activities that are not constitutionally protected, but its flaw is that, as drafted, it
also includes activities protected by the First Amendment. '7' As will be discussed
below, defendants have argued that broadly drafted hazing statutes may potentially
prohibit otherwise protected speech.71
The void for vagueness doctrine applies to all criminal laws and requires that
"[a]ll such laws must provide fair notice to persons before making their activity
criminal and also to restrict the authority of police officers to arrest persons for a
violation of the law."72 Given the variety of the different states' hazing statutes,
some statutes are more prone to challenges for vagueness than are others.73 The
New York statute examined below, for example, defined "hazing" as including
"treatment such as the wearing of a 'beanie cap' to the permanent disfigurement of
the body."74
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires that no person
be denied equal protection of the law of any state.75 This guarantee governs all state
"actions which classify individuals for different benefits or burdens under the
law."76 Most hazing statutes are specifically drafted for application in the collegiate
and university setting."I Thus, as will be seen below, defendants in at least one case
66. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-5-201 (Michie 1993) (forbidding "[t]he playing of abusive or truculent
tricks").
67. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.8, at 996 (5th ed.
1995) (discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
68. See id § 16.9, at 1001 (discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to criminal statutes).
69. See id § 14.2, at 597 (detailing the concept of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. Id. § 16.8, at 996.
71. See infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text (examining the defendants' overbreadth arguments in
Illinois v. Anderson, 591 N.E.2d 461 (Ill. 1992)).
72. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 67, § 16.9, at 1001.
73. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting that Arkansas' hazing statute forbids "[t]he playing
of abusive or truculent tricks").
74. Lena 1. 253 N.Y.S.2d at 13 (referencing New York State Penal Law section 1030).
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (stating, "[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws!).
76. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 67, § 14.1, at 595.
77. See, eg., ARK. CODE-ANN. § 6-5-201 (Michie 1993) (limiting hazing to "[a]ny willful act on or off the
property of any school, college, university, or other educational institution.").
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have attempted to challenge a hazing statute as unfair to students of colleges and
universities.78
Constitutional challenges based on the doctrines mentioned above are discussed
in the following two cases.
1. New York v. Lenti
New York v. Lent (Lent 1),79 involved a group of young men in Nassau County,
New York, planning an initiation ceremony for the purpose of inducting pledges
into the Omega Gamma Delta fraternityY' During the event, dubbed the "Hell
Night" initiation ceremony, five pledges were struck about their bodies and faces
"with clenched fists, open hands, forearms and feet., 81 The four individual
organizers were subsequently indicted for the crime of hazing under section 1030
of the New York State Penal Law.
82
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the hazing statute
was unconstitutional, because the language of the statute was vague and indefinite.83
The court first noted that "[a] thorough search has not revealed any decision
concerning hazing rendered by either a Court of the State of New York, a Court of
any of our sister states or a court of England." To determine the validity of the
challenged statute, the court applied the "pertinent and recognized principles of
statutory construction."'
To survive a constitutional challenge of vagueness, "a criminal statute must be
sufficiently explicit so that all those who are subject to" its penalties will know
which acts to avoid.8 6 In reaching this determination, the words in penal statutes are
78. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing one Equal Protection challenge to a hazing
statute).
79. Lend 1, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9.
80. Id. at 10-11 (describing the facts which gave rise to a constitutional challenge to New York's hazing
statute).
81. Id. at 11.
82. See id. at 10 (setting forth the indictment against the defendants). The defendants were also charged
with the crime of third degree assault in violation of Section 244 of the penal law. Id. at 11. Section 1030 of the
penal law provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in or aid or abet what is commonly called hazing, in or
while attending any of the colleges, public schools or other institutions of learning in this state, and
whoever participates in the same shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall
be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or imprisonment not less than
thirty days nor more than one year, or both at the discretion of the court...
AL
83. Id With respect to the charges of third degree assault, the defendants asserted the defense of consent.
Id. at 15. The court rejected this claim, however, stating that "[s]urely consent is not a carte blanche license to
commit an unabridged assault." Id.
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to be given their commonly accepted meaning in order that citizens will know
exactly what is forbiddenY In order to define "hazing," the Lentil court noted that
the term previously had been defined as "striking, laying hands upon, treating with
violence, or offering to do bodily harm to a new cadet with intent to punish or injure
him; or other treatment of a tyrannical, abusive, shameful, insulting or humiliating
nature."88 The court added to its inquiry the language of section 1030, which
included within the definition of hazing "treatment such as the wearing of a 'beanie
cap' to the permanent disfigurement of the body."' 9
After noting that "[i]t would have been an impossible task if the legislature
[had] attempted to define hazing specifically [because] [firatemal organizations and
associations have never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms of hazing," the
court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.' ° Pointing to the
possibly limitless range of conduct that could be included between "the wearing of
a 'beanie cap' and the permanent disfigurement of the human body," the court
concluded that "it is impossible to draw an arbitrary line in advance defining what
is obviously legal and illegal." 91
When the Lend case eventually went to trial the following year, all indictments
were dismissed.9" The Lenti II court found that because the pledges of the "Hell
Night" ceremony "participated" in the ceremony, they were technically in violation
of the hazing statute as accomplices. 93 As accomplices to the hazing, the pledges'
testimony required corroboration. 94 Because this corroboration was lacking, the
indictments had to be dismissed.95
The Lenti II court was obviously troubled by the findings of Lent! I regarding
the constitutionality of section 1030 of the New York Penal Law. While the Lenti
Icourt upheld the hazing statute against constitutional challenges for vagueness and
ambiguity, the Lenti II court referred to the same statute as "not only vague, but
also ambiguous." 96 Despite its obvious discontent, however, the Lenti II court was
required to adhere to the findings of law reached in Lenti L
97
87. Id.
88. See id. (borrowing the definition from BOUVImR'S LAW DICTIONARY 497 (1948), which took its
definition from the case of Kentucky Military Institute v. Bramblet, 164 S.W. 808 (1914)). The court also cited
WEamasr's THRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcnoIARY 1916, which defined hazing as "the subjecting (as a
freshman or fraternity pledge) to treatment intended to put in ridiculous or disconcerting position." Id.
89. Id. at 13 (referencing New York State Penal Law section 1030).
90. Id. at 13-14.
91. Id.
92. New York v. Lenti, 260 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Nassau County Ct. 1965) [hereinafter Lenti 11].
93. See id. at 286 (inquiring whether because the statute "refers to participants, which of necessity must




97. Id. at 286-87. The court stated-
[fin a preliminary motion this Court passed upon the validity of the statute in question; it is [a] well
established practice that the [Lentl 1] decision established the law of the case, to be adhered to by
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After first noting that "reservations in the thinking of the Court exist as to the
validity and enforceability of the hazing statute," the Lent II court stated that its
decision was "in complete harmony with the [Lenti] ruling." 98 This seeming lip-
service to the Lend I court was then followed by a lengthy recommendation to the
New York Legislature."
Two of the Lent II court's recommendations are worth noting for present
purposes. First, the court voiced its strong opinion that the consent of pledges to
endure hazing should never serve as a bar to prosecution: "[Intelligent consent
cannot be a defense when the pubic conscience and morals are shocked.' '"" ° The
court further recommended that participation by pledges in hazing activities does
not make them accomplices.'0 ' To facilitate this result, the court stressed that only
active planning and execution of the hazing activities ought to warrant indictment
under the statute. To bolster this position, the court offered its own definitions of
the terms "engage" and to "aid or abet":
Engage-the word 'engage' as used in [section 1030 of the Penal Code]
should mean and include... any member of a fraternity who actually
participates in planning the hazing procedures, as well as those who
physically execute the practices.
Aid or Abet-Aiding or abetting as used in this statute should not refer to
the 'pledges' or individuals upon whom the hazing practices are
administered; they should not be deemed accomplices as a matter or law
and their testimony should not require corroboration to establish a violation
of the Section, but the violation itself must be established by other
independent evidence. °2
Despite these suggestions, the New York Legislature's 1968 and 1988
amendments to the hazing statute did not incorporate these provisions.0 3
Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The rationale of the rule is to avoid protracted litigation, to promote
harmony and to foster the exercise of comity and courtesy.
Id.
98. Id. at 287. Taking these statements together, it seems that the Lenti H court was trying to let the Lend




102. Id. at 289.
103. Lewis, supra note 43, at 129.
1101
2000/In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol Related Deaths
2. Illinois v. Anderson
A second challenge to the constitutionality of state hazing statutes was
addressed in Illinois v. Anderson (Anderson 1).104 In Anderson I, members of the
men's lacrosse team at Western Illinois University were charged with violating
Illinois' hazing statute after one of the lacrosse team initiates died of alcohol
poisoning. '0 The trial judge dismissed the charges, ruling that the hazing statute'0 6
was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague in violation of both the United States
and Illinois Constitutions.'0 7 Upon the state's direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme
Court, the defendants proposed three challenges to the constitutionality of the
statute: overbreadth, vagueness, and equal protection. 8
a. Overbreadth
The defendants first argued that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad
because it could potentially punish constitutionally protected speech. °9 This
argument posited that:
the hazing statute could prevent the ridiculing of groups like the Ku Klux
Klan or Neo-Nazis; the criticism of court decisions or legal theories as part
of the teaching process; ridiculing political figures in speeches on campus;
or teaching works of authors such as Twain, Chaucer, or Shakespeare,
which contain satire or ridicule of other persons."'
This argument, ultimately rejected by the court, was based on two separate
misconceptions regarding the hazing statute. First, the defendants interpreted the
statute as creating a strict liability offense, i.e. not requiring that a specific mens rea
be possessed while committing the offense."' The court rejected this interpretation,
104. 591 N.E.2d 461 (1992) [hereinafter Anderson 1]. See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the civil
counterpart to this case).
105. Id. at 464.
106. Id. The statute read:
[wihoever shall engage in the practice of hazing in this state, whereby any one sustains an injury to
his person therefrom, shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
The term 'hazing' in this act shall be construed to mean any pastime or amusement, engaged in
by students or other people in schools, academies, colleges, universities, or other educational
institutions of this state, or by people connected with any of the public institutions of this state,
whereby such pastime or amusement is had for the purpose of holding up any student, scholar or
individual to ridicule for the pastime of others.
Id. at 464 (quoting from 1Ml. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 144, 11221-22).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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however, finding that where a statute does not specify a culpable mental state, the
Illinois Criminal Code's default provision requires the state to prove intent,
knowledge or recklessness." 2
The second portion of the defendants' misinterpretation centered around the
language of the statute which forbade "injury to [the victim's] person." 3 The
defendants argued that this broad definition conceivably could include
psychological injury, thus potentially invoking the statute "whenever a person's
feelings are hurt by being ridiculed."'"4 The court disagreed with this interpretation
and held that the statute referred only to physical or bodily injury 1 5
b. Vagueness
The Anderson I defendants also argued that the Illinois hazing statute was
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 6 When a charge of vagueness is asserted, two claims can be made:
first, that the statute "fails to give a fair warning to innocent people to steer clear
of its prohibitions"; or, second, that the statute "contains insufficiently clear
standards for those who enforce it," thus inviting the possibility of "arbitrary
enforcement."" 7
. Failure to Give Fair Warning
When deciding whether or not a statute has given fair warning, the court noted
that the central inquiry is whether "the statute [has given] a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is lawful and what
conduct is unlawful."' 8 The defendants first tried to argue that certain phrases of
the statute were unconstitutionally vague. 19 For instance, the defendants argued that
the phrases which forbade hazing committed by "other people in schools" and
112. See id. (referring to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, 1 4-3(b), which provides that "[i]f [a] statute does not
prescribe a particular mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves
absolute liability), any mental state defined in Sections 4-4 [intent], 4-5 [knowledge] or 4-6 [recklessness] is
applicable").
113. Id. at 465.
114. Id. at 466.
115. Id. The defendants supported their interpretation by comparing the hazing statutes' "injury to his
person" clause to the Illinois home invasion statute, which punished "any injury" to the victim. Id. The defendants
argued that just as the "any injury" clause of the home invasion statute was interpreted to include psychological
trauma in the case of People v. Ehrich (519 N.E.2d 1137 (1988)] so, too, ought the hazing statute be interpreted.
Id. The court rejected this theory, finding that recent laws like the home invasion statute shed little light upon the
hazing statute, which was written by the Illinois Legislature in 1901. Id.
116. Id. at 467.
117. Id.
118. See id. (quoting People v. Bales, 483 N.E.2d 517 (111. 1985)).
119. Id.
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"people connected with any of the public institutions of [Illinois]" were vague.1
20
Under Illinois law, however, a defendant may be prosecuted under a statute if his
or her conduct clearly falls within the statute even if the statute may be vague as to
other conduct. '2'Because the defendants were "students... in... universities," the
court found that the statute applied to them.'2
Next, the defendants challenged the phrases "pastime or amusement" and
"holding up... to ridicule.' ' " Because these terms were not defined within the
statute, the court noted that it would "assume that statutory words have their
ordinary and popularly understood meanings."' 24 To ascertain the popular meaning
of these terms, the court looked to Webster's Dictionary and held that requiring the
decedent to drink dangerous amounts of alcohol clearly was done for the
defendants' amusement."z The court also referred to the case of Quinn v. Sigma
Rho Chapter of Alpha Beta Theta Pi Fraternity,26 which held that fraternal
activities that included excessive drinking clearly constituted "an illegal hazing
activity" and that "the hazing statute was meant to apply to dangerous drinking
activities such as those practiced by the fraternity."'
' 7
ii. Arbitrary or Discriminatory Enforcement
After deciding that the Illinois hazing statute was not vague for failing to give
fair warning to people seeking to avoid prohibited conduct, the court further
inquired whether the statute promoted arbitrary enforcement by lacking explicit
standards.' 2 While the court conceded that the definition of hazing is broad, it
rejected the defendants' contention that the police may make arrests whenever
someone is "held up to ridicule.""' Referring back to its finding under the
defendants' overbreadth challenge, the court noted that hazing charges may only be
brought where one recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engages in conduct that
120. Id.
121. Id. at 467.
122. Id.
123. Id. The challenged language read, in relevant part: "ft]he term 'hazing' in this act shall be construed
to mean any pastime or amusement... whereby such pastime or amusement is had for the purpose of holding up
any student, scholar or individual to ridicule for the pastime of others." Id. at 464.
124. Id. at 467. The court further noted that "the English language cannot be expected to be mathematically
precise" and the legislature was not required to specify every activity that could be considered a "pastime or
amusement" in which one is held up to ridicule. id.
125. Id. at 468. The court looked to the Webster's definitions of "pastime," "amusement," "hold up," and
"ridicule:' "Pastime" was defined as "something that assumes and serves to make time pass agreeably";
"amusement" was defined as "a means of... entertaining"; to "hold up" was defined as "to expose or call
attention to" and "ridicule" was defined as "the arousing of laughter, mockery, or scorn." Id.
126. 507 N.E.2d 1193 (II. App. Ct. 1987). See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the Quinn case).
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results in physical injury.' Thus, the physical injury requirement, when coupled
with the other elements of the statute-i.e., activities engaged in by students or
other persons as a pastime for the purpose of holding another to ridicule-precluded
arbitrary enforcement."'
c. Equal Protection
Finally, the defendants argued that the hazing statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment because it applied only to
students and others in public institutions rather than the general public. 3 2 The court
noted that the legislature has broad authority to make classifications for the general
welfare and subjected the statute to a rational basis test.133 After inquiring whether
the classification had a rational relation to a legitimate state objective, the court
found that the state had a legitimate interest in preventing physical injury."M The
court further concluded that there was a rational basis for limiting the conduct to the
named groups because "it is reasonable to assume that most hazing occurs in
colleges, universities and other schools.' 35 The court noted that: "[tjhe legislature
need not deal with all conceivable evils at once; it may proceed one step at a
time."
1' 36
D. Summary of Hazing Practices and Statutes
Hazing practices have been observed for centuries within various cultures and
within the various sub-cultures of the same. 3 7 In the modem era, however, hazing
has become most closely associated with collegiate fraternities. Most of the fifty
states have enacted hazing statutes 3s in an attempt to combat the rising number of
injuries.
In the Lenti and Anderson cases discussed above, the hazing statutes at issue
ultimately survived constitutional challenge. 39 While good arguments have been
made that certain hazing statutes are vague and may potentially punish otherwise
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 468-69.




137. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (documenting hazing practices within the military, high
school sports teams, college marching bands, professional sport teams, and others).
138. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (setting forth forty state hazing statutes).
139. The section of the New York penal law challenged in the Lend cases was technically upheld, but the
dicta of the Lenti 11 court suggest that this decision may have been erroneous. See supra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the Lent 1 court's implied dissatisfaction with the conclusion reached by Lend
I).
1105
2000/In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol Related Deaths
protected speech, the courts largely have been unwilling to strike down the statutes
as unconstitutional. These statutes and cases upholding the statutes indicate a strong
public policy condemning the practice of hazing. As will be seen in the next Part,
courts faced with plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries caused as a result of hazing
activities have likewise sent a rather strong message that hazing practices will no
longer be tolerated.
IV. THMORIES OF LABEIrTY
Hazing victims (or, in wrongful death actions, the families of hazing victims)
bringing civil actions have found relative success under various legal theories.
There is no uniform way of approaching alcohol-related hazing lawsuits. Thus, this
Part will summarize briefly the relevant concepts of negligence law and then
analyze the cases one by one to examine how the various courts have imposed
liability. 140
A. The Elements of Negligence and Related Concepts
A plaintiff alleging negligence must prove each of the following six elements
by a preponderance of the evidence: duty, standard of care, breach of duty, cause-
in-fact, proximate cause, and damages."" The duty element has been central to
cases examining fraternal liability for alcohol-related injuries and deaths and will
be examined below.142 The concepts of assumption of the risk and comparative
negligence1 43 and negligence per se144 are also relevant to cases examining liability
for hazing.
1. Duty
The duty element of negligence has been defined as "[a] duty, or obligation,
recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a certain standard of
conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.' 4 In determining
140. See infra at Part IV.A.1-3 (discussing negligence law and relevant concepts); see infra Part IV.B.1-5
(setting forth cases examining civil liability).
141. Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 138 P.2d 112, 115 (Wyo. 1992); JOHN L. DIAMOND Er AL.,
UNDERSTANDING ToRs § 3.01, at 45-46 (1996).
142. See infra Part IV.A.1 (examining the duty element).
143. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the doctrines of assumption of the risk and comparative negligence).
144. See infra Part IV.A.3 (detailing the doctrine of negligence per se).
145. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEON].
1106
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
the existence of a duty, the law distinguishes between action, or "misfeasance," and
inaction, or "nonfeasance."' 146
In cases of misfeasance, the defendant is said to have created an unreasonable
risk of harm to the plaintiff through affirmative acts; in cases of nonfeasance, the
defendant has made the plaintiff's situation no worse, and has "merely failed to
benefit [the plaintiff] by interfering in his affairs."' 47 While liability for cases of
misfeasance may extend to any person harmed by the defendant's conduct, cases
of nonfeasance require a showing to find some relation between the parties such
that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act.'4 Thus, while a duty is
almost automatic in cases involving misfeasance, duty is much harder to establish
in cases of nonfeasance.
Elder fraternity members qua defendants in negligence actions generally argue
that their failure to care for intoxicated pledges qualifies as nonfeasance and is
therefore non-actionable.' 49 This contention is firmly supported by the common law
rule that a person does not have a duty to aid another.'-" In some scenarios,
however, courts will nonetheless impose liability in cases involving nonfeasance.'
Two exceptions to the "no duty for nonfeasance" rule include situations in which
a special relationship exists between the parties and situations in which the
defendant voluntarily undertakes to help an injured individual.
5 2
Some courts have imposed a duty to rescue where a "special relationship" exists
between the parties.' Traditionally, such "special relationships" applied only
where a plaintiff had clearly entrusted his safety to the defendant. 54 Examples
included the relationships created between common-carriers and passengers,
innkeepers and guests, and ship captains and their seamen. 5
Scholars note that in modem times, these special relationships are likely to
include the relationships encompassed between employers and employees, and
146. See Mesmer v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1059-60 (Md. 1999) (discussing the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 145, § 56, at 373 (same).
147. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 145, § 56, at 373.
148. Id. at 374.
149. One might argue that the act of providing liquor to the pledges constitutes actionable misfeasance.
Under common law principles, however, neither sellers of liquor nor social hosts were liable to those injured by
defendants to whom the hosts provided liquor. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1714(c) (West 1998) (codifying the
common law that "no social host who furnishes alcoholic beverage to any person shall be held legally accountable
for damages by such person, or for injury to the person or property of, or death of, any third person, resulting from
the consumption of such beverages"). This common law rule presumably also applies to those who injure
themselves while intoxicated.
150. See Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. 1966) (holding defendant had no duty to rescue
where minor child fell into defendant's pool, while playing with defendant's child).
151. DIAMoND ETAL., supra note 141, § 8.02[A], at 115.
152. Id.
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schools and their students."5 In Easlerv. Hejaz Temple of Greenville,5 7 a court held
that fraternal organizations owed a duty of care to their initiates not to cause them
injury in the initiation process."' Thus, at least one court has found a duty of care
towards initiates for fraternal organizations.'59
Another avenue through which a court may create a duty to care for an injured
individual exists where someone voluntarily undertakes to help someone in need. 6°
Under the traditional view of this exception, a person who voluntarily undertakes
to help an injured individual must not leave the victim in a worse position.'61 Under
the modem approach, however, a voluntary rescuer is obligated to act reasonably
in conducting rescue efforts.162
As will be discussed more fully below," a fraternity member who might
otherwise not owe a duty of care to an intoxicated pledge may be found to have
undertaken a duty of reasonable care by helping the pledge. Under this theory, a
court might find that the simple act of moving an unconscious pledge to a bed or
a couch or placing a bucket near the pledge's head might trigger the undertaking to
care for exception.' 64
Courts have also created a duty between fraternity members and pledges by
focusing on the requirement of drinking as a condition of acceptance into a
fraternity.16 A court adopting this rationale may start by observing that young
persons attach great social value to fraternity membership.' 6 From this starting
point, a court then may note that participating in an initiation ceremony is required
in order to become a fraternity member. 67 Because drinking is central to such
ceremonies, pledges may be found to have been pressured and coerced into
156. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTs § 314A, cmt b. (1965) (stating that the "law appears
... to be working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relationship of dependence or
of mutual dependence").
157. 329 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1985). See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (examining the Easier
rationale).
158. Easier, 329 S.E.2d at 755.
159. Id.
160. Parvi v. Cityof Kingston, 362N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1977);DAMoNDErAL., supra note 141, § 8.02[A][3],
at 118-20.
161. DIAMoND Er AL., supra note 141, § 8.02[A][3], at 118.
162. Id.
163. See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (detailing the "undertaking to care" doctrine in the
context of injured pledges).
164. See infra note 296 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of finding liability from
undertaking to help an intoxicated pledge).
165. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (noting a court decision which found that requiring
pledges to drink in order to become members constitutes coercion and creates a duty to care for the pledges).
166. See infra note 219 and accompanying text (explaining one court's articulation of the social value
placed upon fraternity membership).
167. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (noting that pressure to drink in order to gain membership
into an organization may overbear a pledge's will to freely choose to drink).
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drinking.16 Thus, because pledges are vulnerable during this quest for social
acceptance, a court may allow a jury to find a duty based on this theory of
coercion."
2. Assumption of the Risk and Comparative Negligence
The doctrine of assumption of the risk has been viewed traditionally as a
complete defense to allegations of negligence.' 70 The Restatement of Torts defines
assumption of the risk by stating that "a plaintiff who fully understands a risk of
harm to himself. .. by the defendant's conduct . . . and who nevertheless
voluntarily chooses to enter or remain... within the area of that risk, under
circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to
recover."171 Thus, a defendant asserting the defense of assumption of the risk must
prove three separate elements: that the plaintiff (1) knew of the particular risk
involved and (2) voluntarily (3) assumed it.' 72
Fraternity members accused of negligence might argue that pledges voluntarily
assume the risk of injury to themselves by participating in initiation ceremonies
because they know the nature of the ceremonies and the inevitable involvement of
alcohol. While this argument is not without merit, it certainly is open to attack.
Regarding the first element, knowledge of risk, it is doubtful that pledges who agree
to participate in initiation ceremonies are fully aware of the specific risks
involved. 73 While most pledges probably anticipate having a severe hangover the
next day, it is unlikely that the pledges know that severe injury-possibly even
death-can result from pledging a fraternity.
Regarding the second element, voluntariness, a question exists as to whether a
pledge truly volunteers to participate in the initiation ceremony.' 74 As was discussed
above' 75 and will be more fully examined below,176 courts have found that because
pledges are required to drink in order to become members of fraternities, their
participation in such ceremonies is not truly voluntary.'"
Related to the defense of assumption of the risk is the doctrine of comparative
negligence. Under this doctrine, a plaintiff is partially barred from recovery to the
168. See infra note 240 and accompanying text (explaining that the requirement of drinking may force a
student into drinking against his or her will).
169. See infra note 286 and accompanying text (quoting one court's synopsis of this theory).
170. DIAMOND Er AL., supra note 141, § 15.04[A], at 254.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oFToRTs § 496C (1965).
172. DIAMOND Er AL, supra note 141, § 15.04[A], at 254.
173. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (examining some of the injuries which have resulted
from hazing).
174. See infra notes 257, 283 and accompanying text (addressing the issue of whether or not pledges truly
volunteer to be hazed).
175. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the coercion theory as it applies to the duty element of negligence).
176. See infra notes 256. 285 and accompanying text (examining the issue of voluntariness).
177. See infra notes 256,285 and accompanying text (quoting one court's view of this coercion theory).
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extent that his or her conduct "falls below the standard to which he [or she] should
conform to for his [or her] own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause
co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's
harm."' 78 Viewing these doctrines together, a court may order a jury to determine
the extent to which a pledge assumed a risk of injury and reduce his recovery in
accordance with their findings. 179 As will be seen below,' 80 this solution has been
adopted by many of the courts faced with the issue of injured pledges seeking
recovery and is most likely the trend of the future.
3. Negligence Per Se
Under the doctrine of negligence per se, a criminal statute may be used to set
the standard of care in a negligence action.' 8' However, not every criminal statute
automatically creates a civil standard of care; rather, judges must examine each
statute in order to determine whether or not that statute provides guidance
appropriate for use in a civil case.182 Two inquiries relevant to the judge's
determination include asking whether the statute was designed to protect against the
type of harm suffered by the plaintiff; and, secondly, whether the plaintiff is part
of the class of persons which the statute was intended to protect.83
At first glance, it seems that the above requirements clearly are met in cases
involving pledges who are injured or killed by hazing rituals involving alcohol.
Most hazing statutes are rather specific as to the types of harms prohibited.84 It is
equally apparent that hazing statutes are primarily designed to protect students
attending colleges and universities. "5 Despite this seeming fulfillment of the
negligence per se doctrine, courts have been hesitant to apply categorically the
principle of negligence per se when evaluating hazing related injuries. 86 This
phenomenon and the concepts related above will be examined more fully in the
discussion of the cases below. 7
178. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) oFTORTS § 463 (1965).
179. See infra note 223 and accompanying text (explaining how a jury may consider a pledge's own
culpability under the theory of comparative negligence).
180. See infra note 293 and accompanying text (noting the use of comparative fault principles).
181. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920) (determining that a criminal ordinance requiring
vehicles to use lights after dusk could establish the standard of care in this negligence case).
182. DIAMoND ET AL, supra note 141, § 6.02, at 89-90.
183. Id.
184. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (setting forth the Delaware hazing statute and the specific
types of harm sought to be prevented by this statute).
185. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (setting forth Arkansas' hazing statute, which limits hazing
to "[a]ny willful act on or off the property of any school, college, university, or other educational institution...").
186. See infra note 265 and accompanying text (illustrating one court's hesitancy in applying the doctrine
of negligence per se).
187. See infra at Part IV.B.I-5 (discussing cases examining the issue of civil liability).
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B. Hazing Case Law
1. Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity
In Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity,18t 20-year-old Barry Ballou pledged
the local chapter of Sigma Nu during the 1979 fall semester at University of South
Carolina.'89 The fraternity scheduled an initiation "Hell Night" party and made
attendance mandatory for all pledges.' 9° Ballou and another pledge arrived at the
house sometime between eight and nine in the evening.191 The pledges were then
required to participate in various drinking activities and were ridiculed if their
abilities did not match up to the expectations of their elder fraternity members."9
By ten-thirty that night-not even three hours after the initiation began-B allou and
three other pledges had passed out.193
Ballou was left on a couch in the fraternity lounge until shortly before midnight,
when his "pale color and lack of responsesiveness" concerned the elder fraternity
members.' 9' After discussing the possibility of taking Ballou to the campus
infirmary, four of the fraternity members left him lying face down on the couch. 95
Ballou was discovered dead the next morning; his subsequent autopsy revealed a
blood-alcohol level of .46%.196
Ballou's father filed a wrongful death action against Sigma Nu, alleging that his
son "was forced by harassment and psychological manipulation to consume
enormous quantities of alcoholic beverages."'19 At trial, the jury returned a verdict
against the fraternity in the amount of $200,000 actual and $50,000 punitive
damages.' 9 The fraternity appealed this decision on questions of duty, proximate
cause, and assumption of the risk. 99
The court began its duty analysis by noting that "[t]he duty of exercising care
to protect another person against injury may be created by contract or by operation
of law.' '200 Under the latter of these two avenues, the court followed the Supreme
188. 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
189. Id. at 491.
190. Id. According to one pledge, the pledges were well aware that they "'would be pretty much expected
to do a good bit of drinking."' Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. (reporting that when one pledge only drank a small amount from the fraternity's "cup of truth:'
the brothers "ridiculed" and "'poked fun' at him").
193. Id. at 492.
194. Id.
195. See id. (stating that a pledge who lived in the fraternity house placed Ballou in the "face down"




199. Id. at 492.
200. Id.
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Court of South Carolina's decision in Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville,2 '
which held that fraternal organizations owe a duty of care to their initiates not to
cause them injury in the initiation process.'
In addition to the Easler rationale, the Ballou court went on to find other
grounds in support of imposing a duty. One of these grounds was premised on the
fact that the fraternity brothers created a hazardous condition by requiring the
pledges to consume dangerous quantities of alcoholic liquors over a short period of
time.23 In support of this contention, the court cited Ibach v. Jackson,°4 which had
held that the administration of alcohol by one person to another "in such quantities
as to cause death, is a breach of duty and a tortious act."205
2. Quinn v. Sigma Rho
In Quinn v. Sigma Rho,206 the Illinois Court of Appeals found that a duty existed
to the injured plaintiff because he was required to drink dangerous amounts of
alcohol and because the state's hazing statute created an automatic duty of care.2°
Quinn, an eighteen-year-old pledge of the Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi
Fraternity, brought a negligence action against the fraternity after he sustained
permanent injuries at the defendant's "Pledge Dad Night" initiation ceremony.03
During the ceremony, plaintiff was required to drink a forty-ounce pitcher of beer,
whiskey, and other liquors purchased by fraternity members.' After losing
consciousness that evening and sleeping until 2:30 the following afternoon, plaintiff
was taken to the hospital when he awoke-still in an intoxicated condition-and
could not properly use his hands or arms.2t0
Quinn alleged that he "suffered neurological damage to his arms and hands
necessitating the attention of a hospital, doctor, and physical therapist and causing
partial disability. '211 After the Circuit Court dismissed the case for plaintiff's failure
to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted, Quinn appealed. 12
The appellate court framed the issue as "whether the fraternity owed a duty to
[Quinn] with respect to requiring the commission of very dangerous acts, including
the highly excessive consumption of intoxicants, as part of the initiation
201. 329 S.E.2d 753 (1985).
202. Ballou, 352 S.E.2d at 492.
203. Id. at 493.
204. 35 P.2d 672 (Or. 1934).
205. See Ballou, 352 S.E.2d 493 (citing Ibach v. Jackson, 35 P.2d at 680).
206. 507 N.E.2d 1193 (Il. App. Ct. 1987).
207. Id. at 1198.
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ceremony.' 213 After first noting that Illinois has traditionally denied recovery in
causes of action alleging the negligent sale and furnishment of alcohol,214 the court
distinguished the facts before them by noting that Quinn "was required to drink to
intoxication in order to become a member of the fraternity. 2 5 Said the court:
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the abuse illustrated in the present
case could have resulted in the termination of life and that plaintiff was
coerced into being his own executioner. Therefore, we hold that a legal
duty was created and [plaintiff's] complaint states a cause of action in
negligence.216
Specifically, the court held that a cause of action existed because of two factors.
First, the court noted that "the fact that plaintiff was required to drink to
intoxication" distinguished the case from the social host or guest situation because
"[t]he social pressure that exists once a college... student has pledged into a
fraternal organization is so great that compliance with initiation requirements places
him or her in a position of acting in a coerced manner."2 17 Second, the court noted
that the state legislature's enactment of a hazing statute2 8 "indicates... a social
policy against embarrassing or endangering our youth through thoughtless and
meaningless activity.' 2 Applying the principles of negligence per se, 2 0 the court
found that Quinn was in the class of persons the hazing statute was designed to
protect and that he suffered a type of harm the statute was designed to prevent.22'
The court reversed the lower court's dismissal of Quinn's complaint and remanded
the matter for further proceedings. z The court noted, however, that "[t]o the extent
that plaintiff acted willingly, liability can be transferred to him under principles of
comparative negligence." m
Thus, the Quinn courtjustified its imposition of a duty on the fraternity because
of the presence of two special factors. Like the Ballou court, the Quinn court noted
that requiring a pledge to drink dangerous amounts of alcohol was central to its
213. Id. at 1195.
214. Id. at 1196. The court noted that the Illinois Dramshop Act (found at ILL. REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 43,
T 94-195) preempted claims against all furnishers of alcohol, including social hosts who provide intoxicating
liquors. Id.
215. Id. at 1197.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1198.
218. Id. at 1196-97. The court referred to ILL. REv. STAT. 1985, ch. 144, '! 221-222. Id. at 1196-97.
219. Id at 1198.
220. The court noted that "[the violation of a statute ... designed for the protection of human life or
property is primafacie evidence of negligence." Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1197.
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decision. 4 Furthermore, the court found that Illinois' hazing statute created a cause
of action under the doctrine of negligence per se.2 However, the Quinn court
reached its decision because both factors were present; thus, the Quinn case
impliedly held that the presence of the hazing statute without more was insufficient
to state a cause of action in Illinois.2 6 Also important was the court's instruction to
apply principles of comparative fault in determining the extent to which the plaintiff
acted willingly in the initiation ceremony.2 7
3. Haben v. Anderson
Haben v. Anderson (Anderson I1)228 recognized the Quinn rule that the
requirement of drinking during an initiation ceremony creates a duty of care toward
pledges. Dale E. Haben, an eighteen-year-old freshman at Western Illinois
University, was a rookie on that school's lacrosse team.'M During an initiation
ceremony held by veteran members of the lacrosse team, Haben and other rookies
were "required to engage in various strenuous physical activities, and submit to acts
intended to ridicule and degrade them."3 0 The initiation ceremony, described by the
court as "a tradition of, and a de facto requirement for, membership in the
[Lacrosse] Club," also required the rookies to consume large quantities of various
intoxicating beverages. 3'
Haben became "highly intoxicated and lost consciousness" during the
"ceremony." 2 Haben was carried by Kolovitz--one of the named defendants-to
Kolovitz's dorm room, where he was laid on the floor and then left alone.233 When
Kolovitz later checked on Haben, he recalled hearing "gurgling" sounds.2M Haben
was discovered dead the following morning, with a blood alcohol level of .34%.23
Relying on Quinn, the trial court found that the plaintiff (decedent's father)
failed to plead that Haben was required to drink to be initiated into the lacrosse
club.36 Haben's father did allege that by taking Haben into his room, Kolovitz had
assumed a duty to care for the decedent3 7 The trial court, however, found that
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1198.
226. This conclusion is supported by the Anderson 1I trial court's holding, discussed infra at Part IV.B.3.
227. Quinn, 507 N.E.2d at 1197.
228. 597 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. 1992).
229. Id. at 656.
230. Id. In addition to other "traditions;' the rookies "had their bodies, faces and hair smeared with various
foods and other materials:' Id.
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plaintiff had failed to allege facts establishing that Kolovitz had voluntarily
assumed a dutyY8 Based on these findings, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's
complaint. 9
On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois found that Haben's "will to drink or
not drink may have been overcome by the requirement to achieve the much valued
status [of joining the lacrosse team] and by the pressure that he was receiving."
240
Based on this conclusion, the court remanded the issue back to the trier of fact to
resolve whether drinking was, in fact, a requirement for membership on the team
and whether the decedent's "will to make a conscious decision about the amount
of alcohol he consumed was actually overborne."24'
The plaintiff also appealed the trial court's finding that he failed to establish
that defendant Kolovitz voluntarily assumed a duty of care for decedent by
removing the unconscious Haben to Kolovitz's room.u2 The court agreed with the
plaintiff and held that the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Kolovitz
assumed a duty of care by placing Haben in his room and that Kolovitz acted
unreasonably by not taking action after hearing "gurgling" noises later that
evening.
243
The Anderson II case is thus significant for two reasons. First, it re-affirms the
holding of Quinn that a duty may be created where a plaintiff can show that a
pledge is required to drink dangerous amounts of alcohol to gain membership into
a club or fraternity. Second, the Anderson II case suggests that undertaking to help
a pledge, once he or she falls ill or unconscious, may provide an alternate ground
of establishing liability.
4. Nisbet v. Bucher
A conclusion similar to that of Anderson II was reached by the Missouri Court
of Appeals in Nisbet v. Butcher.24 Michael Nisbet, who was a freshman at the
University of Missouri at Rolla, was invited to become a member of that school's
Saint Pat's Board.245 The Saint Pat's Board was a campus organization responsible
for organizing the annual Saint Patrick's Day festivities at the university.246 To
become a member, Nisbet was "required to participate in an initiation" ceremony.247
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 659.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 660.
243. Id.
244. 949 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
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In their complaint, the plaintiff's, the parents of Michael Nisbet, alleged that
during this ceremony, Nisbet was forced to consume various intoxicants, including
a "heated preparation of grain alcohol and green peas."2 8 Nisbet was coerced to
consume this concoction until he became intoxicated and lapsed into
unconsciousness.24 9 When Nisbet fell unconscious, members of the Board placed
him face down on the ground and left him unattended, despite the fact that Nisbet
was "secreting green fluid from his nose and mouth."2' 0 Nisbet died the next day
from acute alcohol intoxication251
The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the Saint Pat's Board,
alleging that they engaged in "negligent, careless and/or reckless" conduct towards
their son.252 The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants permitted the hazing
activities in violation of the applicable Missouri hazing statute.25 The trial court
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that "a violation of the [Missouri]
hazing statute does not give rise to a private cause of action ... as a matter of
law."
, %
The court of appeals addressed the sole issue of whether the plaintiffs could
proceed under a claim of common law negligence.255 Citing Quinn, Ballou, and
Anderson II, the court found that because Nisbet's "will to drink or not drink may
have been overborne by the requirements to achieve membership on the St. Pat's
Board and by the pressure he was receiving from defendants," the case should be
remanded to a jury to determine that particular issue5 6 The court also noted,
consistent with Quinn and its progeny, that the trier of fact should apply the
principles of comparative negligence in determining Nisbet's willingness to
participate in the initiation ceremony.257
The court further noted that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that the
defendants' abandonment of Nisbet might give rise to an alternate theory of
liability, stating that "[o]ne who acts gratuitously or otherwise is liable for the
negligent performance of an act, even though there was no duty to act originally."'2 8
The court refused to address the issue of whether the defendants' violation of





252. ld. at 114.
253. Id. at 113. The statute defined hazing as including "[a]ny activity which recklessly endangers the
physical health or safety of the ... prospective member ... including.., forced consumption of... liquor." Id.
at n.1 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.360).
254. Id. at 114.
255. Id. at 115.
256. Id. at 116.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. id. at 117.
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acts proscribed by the hazing statute are also actionable at common law."26° The
court further noted that the presence of the statute "merely evinces a public policy
that certain activities directed against prospective members of an organization...
will not be tolerated."2'
The Nisbet decision thus further solidifies the principles established by Ballou,
Quinn and their progeny: requiring an individual to drink as a condition precedent
to gaining membership in a club may give rise to a cause of action;262 principles of
comparative fault may be applied by the jury in determining the level of a
defendant's culpability;263 and helping an incapacitated individual might provide
an alternate theory of establishing liability.26 Also, the Nisbet opinion shows the
courts' apprehension towards deciding the issue of whether the presence of a hazing
statute, standing alone, is enough to create a cause of action under the doctrine of
negligence per se.'
5. The Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Trilogy
A 1998 initiation ceremony at Clarkstown University in Potsdam, New York,
gave rise to a trilogy of cases after a pledge died from choking on his own vomit.2 6
The Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity, Inc. (Oja 1)267 case addressed
the initial wrongful death actions brought by decedent Oja's parents against
members of the fraternity.m The case of Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi
Fraternity, Inc., (Oja 1)269 addressed a specific claim brought by the plaintiffs
against defendant, Delta Sigma of the Theta Chi Alumni Corporation, an issue
beyond the scope of this Comment2 ° The Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 116.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id. (indicating that "it is not necessary to decide whether defendant's violation of the hazing statute
... constituted negligence per se" to decide the issue before the court).
266. Oja v. Grand Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity, Inc., 680 N.Y.S.2d 277,278 (App. Div. 1998). See infra
notes 267-69 and accompanying text (discussing the cases resulting from the death of Binaya Oja).
267. 680 N.Y.S.2d 277.
268. 667 N.Y.S.2d 650 (S. Ct. 1997).
269. 680 N.YS.2d 277 (S. Ct. 1997).
270. The Oja II opinion addressed a motion to dismiss by defendant Delta Sigma of Theta Chi Alumni
Corporation, which owned the house in which the party was held. Id. at 278. The Alumni Corporation challenged
the plaintiffs' allegation that the corporation "negligently and recklessly failed to control, investigate, supervise
or monitor the activities taking place on its premises." Id. The defendant corporation primarily relied on
established case law recognizing that a fraternity does not ordinarily have a duty to supervise affirmatively those
present in a fraternity house and prevent them from engaging in potentially harmful conduct. Id. While the Oja
II court noted this principle, it upheld the denial of the corporation's motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs had
put on sufficient facts from which the trier of fact could conclude that the corporation had actual or constructive
knowledge of dangerous activities taking place on its property. Id. at 278-79. Thus, the Oja 11 court held that the
"plaintiffs' allegations fit within a cognizable theory of negligence" and could proceed to trial. Id. at 279.
1117
2000/In Vino Mortuus: Fraternal Hazing and Alcohol Related Deaths
Fraternity, Inc., (Oja II1J)l decision considered the individual fraternity members'
appeal from the Oja I decision.
Binaya Oja was a freshman pledge of the Delta Sigma Chapter of the Theta Chi
Fraternity.272 During the fraternity's initiation ceremony, the pledges were
assembled together and commanded to drink from various bottles of liquor.27a A
number of garbage cans were placed within the immediate vicinity of the pledges
to "contain the inevitable regurgitations induced by [the initiation ceremony]." 4
Oja threw up repeatedly as a result of the alcohol, became unconscious, and was left
unattended in that condition.275 Oja eventually died after he choked on his vomit.
27 6
Plaintiffs, parents of the decedent, alleged that, after their son had become visibly
intoxicated, members of the fraternity took him to the third floor of the fraternity
house, laid him face down on a couch, and placed a bucket underneath his head.
2"
In Oja I, the Tompkins County Supreme Court addressed the fraternity member
defendants' motions to dismiss two of the plaintiffs' causes of action." 8
Specifically, the defendants challenged the first cause of action, which alleged that
their negligence and recklessness caused the decedent's intoxication and that they
failed to provide medical assistance to him." 9 The defendants also challenged the
plaintiffs' allegations that a private cause of action was created under New York's
hazing statute.28
The defendants primarily relied on Sheeny v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc.,2'
which held that Penal Law section 260.20(4),which penalized the sale or provision
of alcohol to a child under the age of nineteen, did not create a private cause of
action against those who provided alcohol to minors.282 The Oja I court first noted
that the purpose of the statute at issue in Sheeny was not "to reward those who,
often by misrepresenting their ages and identities, obtain and abuse alcohol and
suffer the consequences of their own folly. ''2 3 The court proceeded to note,
however, that the hazing statute at issue in this case was "based upon [policy]
271. 684 N.Y.S.2d 344 (App. Div. 1999).
272. Id. at 345.
273. Oja 1, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Oja 11, 680 N.YS.2d at 278.
277. Oja 111, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46.
278. Oja 1, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
279. Id.
280. See id(setting forth the plaintiffs' allegation that New York Penal Law section 120.16 created a private
cause of action by making it a misdemeanor for a person to intentionally or recklessly engage in conduct that
causes an injury to a "pledge" during the course of an initiation).
281. 543 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1989).
282. Oja 1, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 651. In Sheeny, an underage girl who had obtained alcohol by using a falsified
driver's license was hit by a car and killed after she was expelled from an American Legion beer tent. Id.
283. Id. at 652.
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considerations . . . vastly different from those which concerned the court in
Sheeny.' '" The court explained:
The Sheeny ruling, to be blunt, reflects an unspoken moral revulsion
against rewarding youthful drunks for their own recklessness and self-
indulgence. No such revulsion seems justified in relation to the injuries and
deaths sustained by adolescents who, however unwisely, trade their
insecurities and free will for the promise of acceptance, and prestige, that
fraternity membership appears to confer. A jury might find that the stoic
acceptance of pain and discomfort by a pledge, as the price of admission
to the fraternal mysteries, is not truly voluntary. In any event, we cannot
conclude, as a matter of law, that the policy considerations which precluded
a civil action in favor of the plaintiff in Sheeny are operative here.2
5
The Oja I court then favorably cited Anderson II and Quinn for the proposition
that the "coercive effect of the initiation ritual, and related issues of culpable
conduct, are questions for the trier of fact to resolve."' 6 The court did not analyze
separately the plaintiffs' allegations of actions based on common law negligence
principles and the theory of negligence per se: "[WIhile the plaintiff has asserted
[his] claim under two different rubrics in the complaint, we see no practical need
to differentiate the two when both allege the same wrong which would merit the
same relief.'' 87
The defendants' appeal of this decision was addressed by the Appellate
Division in Oja IIl." s The Oja III opinion affirmed the Oja I court's conclusions
and even hinted at a third possible avenue through which the plaintiffs could
recover:
Not only have plaintiffs alleged facts that could lead a trier of fact to
conclude that decedent's intoxication was not entirely voluntary [per
Anderson and Quinn], they have also cited other purportedly careless acts
by defendants-beyond the mere furnishing of intoxicants-upon which
a finding of negligence could be grounded. Specifically, it is alleged that
after decedent had become visibly intoxicated, unable to stand and
incapable of aiding or protecting himself, fraternity members took him to
a third floor of the house, laid him face down on a couch with a bucket
underneath his head, and left him unattended in an unconscious state. If it




287. Id. at 652-53.
288. 684 N.YS.2d 344 (App. Div. 1999).
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a finding of liability without regard to the defendants' earlier act of simply
making the alcohol available.' 9
C. Summary of Civil Hazing Cases
The Oja trilogy is instructive as a summary of how various courts have treated
negligence actions arising from alcohol-related hazing injuries and deaths. The first
possible avenue of recovery is the "required drinking" or "coercion" theory first
enunciated in Ballou and fleshed out in Quinn and subsequent cases. 29° Under this
theory, a plaintiff may proceed to the jury on the issue of whether drinking to
intoxication was required to become a member of a particular organization. 29' If a
jury feels sympathetic to the plight of young individuals seeking social acceptance
in the security of a fraternity, it may find coercion and attach liability.92 Of course,
the cases also make clear that the jury is free to apply principles of comparative
fault in determining to what extent, if any, the victim acted willingly.293
The second possible avenue for plaintiffs seeking recovery is to allege that,
independent of the furnishment of alcohol and subsequent creation of a dangerous
situation, defendants may be liable under the "undertaking to help" theory of
negligence.294 Under this theory, a person who might otherwise be free from a legal
obligation to help assumes a duty of reasonable care by offering relief or assistance
to an injured or helpless person.295 In the context of hazing and intoxicated pledges,
anyone who moves a pledge to a couch or bed or who otherwise takes any step
indicative of helping that individual may be found to have assumed a duty of
reasonable care.296 In Anderson II, for example, defendant Kolovitz carried the
intoxicated pledge to Kolovitz's room and laid the pledge on the floor, and during
a subsequent check, the pledge was heard "gurgling."' One could conclude that
Kolovitz's failure to investigate further or call for medical help was unreasonable
and thus negligent. The Nisbet case presented a similar situation. The intoxicated
pledge was placed faced down on the ground and left unattended after he became
289. Oja 111, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46.
290. See supra notes 203-05, and 215-17 and accompanying text (setting forth the courts' treatment of
required drinking as coercive).
291. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (illustrating the Anderson ll court's decision to remand the
case to the trier of fact to determine whether drinking was a condition precedent to membership).
292. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (setting forth the description of the jury's task in such
cases).
293. See, e.g., Quinn v. Sigma Rho, 507 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (Bl. App. CL 1987) (stating that "[t]o the extent
that (a] plaintiff acted willingly, liability can be transferred to him under principles of comparative negligence").
294. See, e.g., 65 CJ.S. § 63 (107), at 859 (1966) (stating that "[o]ne who undertakes to care for an ill or
injured person is bound to use reasonable or ordinary care").
295. Id.
296. Anderson 11, 597 N.E.2d at 657.
297. Id.
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unconscious. 98 Using the "undertaking to help" theory of negligence, the act of
moving the pledge could be viewed as voluntarily assuming a duty of care; the
subsequent failure to take further action could be found "unreasonable." 299
The third possible approach for hazing victims is to proceed under the theory
of negligence per seo and to argue that the violation of a state hazing statute
automatically creates a private cause of action. As the case law indicates, however,
courts have been hesitant to declare that the violation of a hazing statute, without
more, creates a private cause of action."0 In the absence of a judicial opinion
categorically creating a private cause of action based solely on a hazing statute, the
prudent plaintiff should therefore allege all of the above theories as avenues for
recovery.
Overall, the courts have been willing to extend the traditional concepts of tort
law to accommodate aggrieved victims, and victims' family members, seeking
damages for their loss. This trend reflects the growing public opinion that hazing
practices involving dangerous amounts of alcohol within colleges and universities
are not to be tolerated and should be abolished altogether. But just how far is the
law willing to go to punish individuals guilty of hazing? The Scot Krueger incident
discussed below raises the issue of whether a fraternity may be held criminally
liable for charges of manslaughter.
V. THE POSSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL LIABILrrY FOR HAZING
While the above cases establish possible theories under which injured pledges
or their estates may recover civil damages for the reckless conduct associated with
initiation ceremonies, the Scot Krueger incident described below asks whether a
fraternity may be held criminally responsible for manslaughter.
298. Nisbet, 949 S.W.2d at 113.
299. Id. at 117.
300. See generally PROSSER & KEEMN, supra note 145, § 36, at 220-34 (setting forth when and how the
standard of care required by a reasonable person may be prescribed by legislative enactment).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26, and 259-61 (discussing the courts' varied treatment of
negligence per se).
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A. Facts of the Scot Krueger Incident
On September 26, 1997, the Phi Gamma Delta3 °2 fraternity at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (M1T) hosted an "Animal House Night" initiation party for
its new pledges. 303 Present at the party was eighteen-year-old freshman pledge Scot
Krueger form Orchard Park, New York.3m Krueger, along with eleven other
pledges, began their initiation by watching National Lampoon's Animal House, the
infamous film depicting college life in a fraternity house.05 After the movie was
over, the pledges were taken to a room by the "pledge-master" where they were
instructed to drink a prescribed amount of alcohol-beer and Jack Daniel's
Whiskey-while singing a fraternity song.3 6 Although it is unclear exactly how
much Krueger drank throughout the course of the evening, stories indicate that
Krueger was also given a bottle of Bacardi Spiced Rum at some point by his "big
brother.
3 7
Later in the evening, Krueger complained of nausea and began to lose
consciousness after lying down on a couch.3 Two of the fraternity's "big brothers"
carried Krueger to his bedroom, placed a trash can near his head, and left him lying
on his abdomen.3 9 Approximately ten minutes later, Krueger was discovered
unconscious and covered in vomit.310 A concerned fraternity member called the
MIT campus police, who directed the call to 911 emergency operators.
311
By the time emergency personnel arrived, Krueger's face had turned blue and
he was choking on his own vomit.312 Krueger was rushed to a nearby Boston
hospital where he remained in a coma for approximately forty hours before he was
302. See Gene Warner, MIT Fraternity Faulted for History of Binge Drinking, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 26,
1998, at Cl (reporting that, according to the legal papers filed in the Krueger case, the Phi Gamma Delta chapter
at MIT was infamous for alcohol.related problems). In the five years preceding the incident, for example, Boston
police officers, MIT police officers, and various medical personnel had been called to the fraternity house on at
least fifteen different occasions. Id. These calls were spurred by complaints of drinking, loud parties, and fighting;
additionally, some of the calls were for students requiring medical attention for binge drinking. Id. The Boston
Licensing Board had disciplined the fraternity twice for drinking-related violations in 1996 and 1997. Id. Despite
these incidents, however, the fraternity never took steps to curb the serious alcohol-related problems. Id.
303. See John Ellement, Court Date But Not Defendant, Is Set in MIT Frat Death Case, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 22, 1998, at B2 (detailing the circumstances surrounding the death of Scot Krueger).
304. Id; see also Warner, supra note 302, at C1 (explaining that Krueger pledged the fraternity four days
after arriving at MIT and moved into a basement room at the fraternity house). Krueger, who allegedly had limited
drinking experience, expressed anxiety about the "Animal House" party to his sister and fellow pledges. Id.
305. Warner, supra note 302, at Cl.
306. Id. The pledges were actually lined up, and they sang a drinking song that ended with the words "drink
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ultimately pronounced dead."' 3 His blood alcohol level was .401, more than five
times the legal limit under Massachusetts's DUI law.314
B. The Criminal Action
The Boston Police immediately launched a criminal investigation.15 In
September of 1998, a Suffolk County grand jury indicted the fraternity on one count
of misdemeanor hazing316 and another count of criminal manslaughter 317 under
Massachusetts law.3 '8 This indictment marked the first time ever in the history of
the United States that a fraternity was charged with the criminal death of an
individual. 19
313. See id. (listing the cause of Krueger's death as acute alcohol intoxication and aspiration).
314. See Today (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 3, 1997) (reporting that Krueger's blood alcohol level was
equivalent to drinking twenty shots of alcohol within one hour).
315. See CBS This Morning (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 1,1997) (noting that members of the fraternity
had obtained legal counsel after the criminal investigation had begun). Only days after the incident, investigating
officials commented that manslaughter charges might be filed if it was discovered that Krueger had been forced
to drink. Id.
316. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 269, § 17 (West Supp. 2000) (setting forth the definition and
punishment for hazing under Massachusetts law). Section 17 reads, in pertinent part:
Hazing; organizing or participating; hazing defined
Whoever is a principal organizer or participant in the crime of hazing ... shall be punished by a fine
of not more than three thousand dollars or by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than
one year, or both such fine and imprisonment.
The term "hazing".. . shall mean any conduct or method of initiation into any student organization
... which wilfully or recklessly endangers the physical or mental health of any student or other person.
Such conduct shall include ... forced consumption of any ... liquor beverage, drug, or other
substance .... [emphasis added].
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, consent shall not be available as
a defense to any prosecution under this action.
317. See Id. ch. 265, § 13 (West 1990) (stating, in part, that "[w]hoever commits manslaughter shall.., be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years or by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail or a house of correction for not more than two and one half years").
Under Massachusetts law, manslaughter has been defined as an unlawful killing without malice. Commonwealth
v. Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d 677, 681 (Mass. 1998). The Vizcarrondo court explained the difference between an
unlawful death with malice and involuntary manslaughter by noting that:
[t]he difference between the elements of the third prong of malice and wanton and reckless conduct
amounting to involuntary manslaughter lies in the degree of risk of physical harm that a reasonable
person would recognize was created by particular conduct, based on what the defendant knew. The risk
for the purposes of the third prong of malice is that there was a plain and strong likelihood of death.
... The risk that will satisfy the standard for wilful and wanton conduct amounting to involuntary
manslaughter involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another.
693 N.E.2d at 681. This distinction, however, raises an interesting question: as more and more deaths result from
the forced consumption of alcohol in fraternity initiation ceremonies, will the "reasonable person" standard
eventually recognize that death is, in fact, a highly likely consequence of such activities?
318. See Lauren Beckham Falcone, Booze Still Rules at Some Frat Houses-Crackdown Hasn't Quenched
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A five page statement issued by Suffolk County District Attorney Ralph C.
Martin II charged, in part, that
[T]he cause of Krueger's death-in real terms-was the wanton and
reckless conduct on the part of the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity, its officers
and its members in promoting and orchestrating the Animal House drinking
event, supplying an inherently dangerous amount of alcohol and then
abandoning Scott Krueger when he was in dire need of medical
treatment.' 20
The grand jury's indictment, which was issued against the local fraternity, carried
fines totaling four thousand dollars. 2' When asked why no charges were sought
against individual members of the fraternity, a spokesperson for the District
Attorney's office stated that "[in this case, we felt that it was the traditions and
actions of the fraternity as a whole that were responsible for [Krueger's death]"
... The individuals claimed to be acting more as a group in following the spirit and
traditions of the fraternity house.
' 323
Despite these charges, the indictment failed to name a specific individual
defendant responsible for appearing at trial. 24 Because the Boston chapter of the
fraternity was legally identified as a voluntary unincorporated association under
Massachusetts law, anyone who may have served as an officer at the time of the
incident was not obligated to respond to the summons.3 When asked who would
appear in court to face the charges, a spokesman for the District Attorney's office
stated that "[t]he fraternity has been indicted, and we're confident that an
appropriate representative of the fraternity will appear in court." '326




324. Ellement, supra note 303, at B2.
325. See id. (stating that, unlike a corporation, which has "easily identified corporate officers who have a
legal obligation to assign a corporate officer to represent the company when charges are filed against it," the
fraternity was under no such legal obligation).
326. Id. A summons was issued to attorney Michael O'Malley, who represented an insurance company
connected with the fraternity; however, because O'Malley did not represent the fraternity itself, he questioned his
legal responsibility to appear in court. Id.
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C. Conclusion of the Scot Krueger Incident?
A day after the indictment against the fraternity was filed, the Phi Gamma Delta
chapter at MIT officially disbanded.3z When the court date arrived, no one showed
up in defense of the fraternity.32 A warrant was later issued against the fraternity
and "filed away" in case the Phi Gamma Delta fraternity ever tries to reorganize at
MIT.329 A spokesman for the Krueger family opined that "[tihe criminal justice
system has failed.
' 30
Despite cynical responses from some members of the legal community,33 a
spokesperson for the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office commented that
"[o]ur aim was to do the right thing in this case. Just because we... can't
guarantee[] a perfect solution doesn't mean we should have strayed from doing the
right thing, which is indicting the fraternity."3 3
2
VI. CONCLUSION
For centuries, hazing has been around in one form or another. In the 1990s,
however, the term "hazing" has become nearly synonymous with collegiate Greek
initiation proceedings involving dangerous amounts of alcohol and freshman
pledges seeking social acceptance. 3" Despite the efforts of state legislatures seeking
327. See Manslaughter Case vs. Frat Stymied, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, Vol. 27, no. 9 (Nov. 2, 1998)
(quoting a lawyer for the Krueger family as asking "(dioes it strike anyone as odd that it was not until September
15, the day after the indictment, that the [Phi Gamma Delta] house was disbanded?"); see also IndictmentAgainst
Fraternity Unraveling-Nobody to Prosecute in Student's Death, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1998, at 16 [hereinafter
Indictment] (reporting that MIT severed ties with the fraternity until 2002).
328. See John Ellement, MIT Frat Death Case Seems a Lost Cause-No Defendant Appears in Court, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 1998, at Al (explaining that the Suffolk County District Attorney's year-long
investigation into the Krueger death ended in a "no-show"); see also Indictment, supra note 327, at 16 (noting that
William Kettlewell, a lawyer for the national Phi Gamma Delta corporation, sent a letter to the Suffolk County
Superior Court saying he was not authorized by the national organization to represent the local fraternity in the
action).
329. See Lacking a Defendant, Fraternity Alcohol Death Case Dissolves, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1998, at 14
(noting that the fraternity may face penalties if it ever tries to reorganize at M'1T).
330. Manslaughter Case vs. Frat Stymied, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, Vol. 27, no. 9 (Nov. 2, 1998).
331. See Indictment, supra note 327, at 16 (quoting Boston criminal defense lawyer J. Albert Johnson as
calling the entire criminal case 'just plain silly" because a fraternity is only "an association of people with no legal
standing in criminal law"). Attorney Randy Chapman, a former prosecutor and chairman of the Massachusetts Bar
Association's criminal justice section, explained the result by saying that "[I]t's like if you have a party and
someone gets hurt, then everybody goes home and they indict the party'). Id.
332. Id.
333. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (noting the close relationship between fraternities and
drinking).
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to curb the traditions of hazing via prohibitory statutes,334 injuries and deaths have
occurred at an alarming rate.335
Civil actions arising from hazing-induced injuries and deaths have posed new
questions for the courts. While the presence of state hazing statutes have been
helpful to the courts' analyses,3  jurisdictions with hazing statutes have been
nonetheless hesitant to apply principles of negligence per se in solving the
problem.
337
Despite this hesitancy, judicial opinions justifying the imposition of liability
have made it clear that alcohol-related hazing deaths will not be tolerated.338
However, because most pledges voluntarily agree to subject themselves to these
humiliating and dangerous rituals, courts have adopted principles of comparative
fault in solving the problem of how to allocate the blame when injuries occur.339
The ultimate question presented by these cases is how to balance the need for social
acceptance against the price that young individuals are willing to pay for it, a
question which a jury may be best suited to answer. The rationale of the Oja I court
is worth reiterating: "No such revulsion ['against rewarding youthful drunks for
their own recklessness and self-indulgence'] seems justified in relation to the
injuries and deaths sustained by adolescents who, however unwisely, trade their
insecurities and free will for the promise of acceptance, and prestige, that fraternity
membership appears to confer."3 ° Thus, "[a] jury might find that the stoic
acceptance of pain and discomfort by a pledge, as the price of admission to the
fraternal mysteries, is not truly voluntary."' This analysis describes the ultimate
issue confronting courts asked to impose liability for hazing related injuries-is
one's decision to pledge a fraternity and participate in initiation ceremonies truly
voluntary?
At a basic level, individuals initially volunteer to join fraternities and other
collegiate organizations. After all, no one forces freshman college students to
"rush" fraternities and seek acceptance therein. But at what point do initiates lose
their autonomy and subject themselves to the whim of senior fraternity members?
Initiation ceremonies are notorious for involving the consumption of alcohol and
334. State hazing statutes are detailed at supra Part HIB.
335. Injuries resulting from hazing activities are set forth at supra notes 12-15. Civil actions seeking to
redress deaths caused by hazing activities are discussed at supra Part IV.B.1-5.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 259-61 (noting that statutes are indicative of a strong public
sentiment against the practice of hazing).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26 (showing that the mere presence of a hazing statute is
insufficient to impose liability).
338. See, e.g., Oja 1, 667 N.Y.S.2d 650, 652 (S. Ct. 1997) (arguing that liability in cases of fraternal hazing
is appropriate because insecure pledges jeopardize their safety in exchange for acceptance by their fraternity).
339. See supra notes 223, 257, and accompanying text (illustrating the courts' use of comparative fault in
hazing incidents).
340. Oja 1, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
341. rd.
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other "tests" of one's character.342 Agreeing to participate in a ceremony, however,
should not give the senior members carte blanche to do anything they wish to the
pledges.
Courts addressing the issue of liability have thus far done a good job of sorting
out the tangle of legal issues presented to them. Applying the principles of
comparative fault43 seems to be the soundest avenue of approach because it allows
the jury to work with a sliding scale in determining liability. If a jury determines
that a pledge "knew what he was getting into," the jury may reduce the pledge's
recovery or bar or it altogether. Conversely, fraternities that exhibit particularly
egregious conduct may be penalized by juries and forced to pay large damage
awards for their mistreatment of pledges.
Courts have been hesitant to apply the doctrine of negligence per se and
categorically create a cause of action based upon an underlying criminal hazing
statute." At first blush, these courts' decisions might not make sense. After all,
state hazing statutes are specifically designed to combat hazing practices within
educational institutions by punishing potential offenders with jail time and/or
monetary fines.
Upon closer examination, however, one possible explanation might lie in the
nature of the statutes themselves. As indicated above,345 many statutes paint with
broad strokes and include within their definition of "hazing" any activity which
might injure the physical or mental health of potential pledges.? But what does this
mean? A colorful argument could be made that referring to initiates with harassing
names like "maggot" or treating them in any demeaning fashion could injure the
"mental health" of pledges. Because such broad definitions have been adopted by
state legislatures, courts might fear that creating an automatic duty of care might
open the floodgates of litigation and bury otherwise worthy cases. Furthermore,
given the apparent efficacy of the alternate avenues of recovery established by the
courtsM7 it is unnecessary to create a per se rule imposing liability based upon
seemingly arbitrary statutes.
While courts have been willing to accommodate civil complaints alleging
negligence in the context of hazing related injuries, resolving the criminal issue
342. See Warner, supra note 302 (reporting that MIT initiate Scot Krueger expressed anxiety to his fellow
pledges about participating in the ceremony that ended in his death).
343. See supra notes 223, 257 and accompanying text (illustrating the courts' use of comparative fault in
hazing incidents).
344. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text (showing the courts' apprehension of applying the
doctrine of negligence per se).
345. The variety and form of state hazing statutes is discussed at supra Part UI.B.
346. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.262 (West 1998) ("[H]azing means any action or situation which
recklessly or intentionally endangers the mental or physical health or safety of a student for the purpose of
initiation.., into ... any organization.").
347. The "coercion" theory of recovery is discussed at supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text. The
"undertaking to help" approach is discussed at supra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
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presented in the Scot Krueger casem is a separate matter and beyond the specific
scope of this Comment.3 9 Despite the complexities of the criminal issue, however,
a possible lesson can be discerned from the civil treatment of hazing cases. As
noted above, courts usually charge ajury with the task of allocating blame between
the victims and the defendants by using principles of comparative fault.310 This
trend, however, implies that hazing victims may be, or in fact are, at least partially
responsible for their fate. This fact alone raises the possibility of a reasonable doubt
and suggests that the higher burden of proof required in criminal matters may never
be met by prosecutors in a hazing case.351
In the end, victims of hazing and, in wrongful death actions, victims' family
members, have succeeded in obtaining monetary justice within civil courts of law.
Setting aside the question of criminal liability, this trend clearly seems justified
when one compares the price paid-sometimes even one's life-for admission into
something as trivial as a collegiate fraternity. When the phrase "dying to get in" to
a fraternity has achieved a literal meaning, someone, somewhere, did something
wrong and should stand to answer in court for his or her conduct.
348. The Scot Krueger incident and the question of criminal liability is discussed at supra Part V.B.
349. The issue of criminal liability raises numerous problems of proximate and legal cause, the analyses of
which are beyond the scope of this Comment.
350. See supra notes 223, 257 and accompanying text (illustrating the courts' use of comparative fault in
hazing incidents).
351. Of course, the possibility of charging a defendant with another criminal offense-battery, for
example-is certainly present should the facts warrant such a charge. The decision in the Krueger case to seek
charges of manslaughter, however, may have been too ambitious.
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